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Abstract 
In this project it is examined how the interplay between the European Union’s powers affects its 
actions in conflict management. The project contains an analysis of the EU’s powers, through a 
focus on hard capabilities and Ian Manners idea on normative power, followed by the 
interrelation between these powers, through Jospeh Nye’s neoliberal perspective. Furthermore, 
an analysis of EU’s strategy for acting in conflicts through ‘successful strategies’ theories on the 
two conflict management tools, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions. Last, the two 
analyses will be combined in the example of EU’s actions in the Ukrainian crisis. The project 
concludes that EU’s actions are affected by its increased focus on smart power. Furthermore, this 
affects EU’s conflict management strategy because it uses economic threats or incentives as a 
way of coercing opponent states into diplomatic solutions based on its normative values. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Problem area 
The European Union (EU) can be perceived as one of the biggest world economies, and as an 
external actor, it exercises a limited use of military power, with a respect for human rights and 
democracy. The EU is considered a global diplomatic power that exercises this through 
consistent regional and international cooperation and integration (Hill & Smith, 2011: 4). 
However, EU’s different economic, military and normative powers, and the success of exercising 
these efficiently through different tools in conflict management have been debated and disputed 
among scholars1. This lead us to the wondering of whether EU’s normative powers and soft 
approaches can be exercised independent, or if they are determined by hard power measures such 
as economic sanctions and use of force. We believe, that a deeper and more comprehensive 
analysis of EU’s potential smart power, and how this directly affects the Unions conflict 
management has not been sufficiently researched and debated2. The term smart power, along 
with the tool coercive diplomacy, has evolved around the US’s conflict management, which is 
why we still see a gap of knowledge in regards to the EU as a global actor in conflict 
management. EU’s conflict management especially becomes interesting because of the current 
crisis in Ukraine. A conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood makes it relevant to analyse EU’s 
potential normative and hard powers, and how these can be transformed into concrete policy 
tools, in order for the EU to engage in the Ukrainian crisis. Our wonderings let us to the 
following problem formulation and research questions. 
 
1.2 Problem formulation and research questions 
 
How does the interplay between the European Union’s powers affect its actions in conflict 
management? 
 
1. What is the interrelation between the EU’s hard and normative power? 
 
                                                 
1 See Literature Review page 4-6 for further explanation. 
2 See Literature Review page 3 for further explanation. 
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2.   How are coercive diplomacy and sanctions related in the EU’s conflict management 
strategy? 
 
3.   How is the EU acting in the Ukrainian conflict in relation to its powers? 
 
1.3 Concept clarification 
Powers 
The strengths a specific actor possesses in international relations and their ability to affect the 
behaviour of other actors. The main focus will be on hard power and normative power and their 
combination into smart power. Hard power is specified in the economic and military capabilities 
an actor might have. Normative power is the ability to shape what passes for normal in 
international relations. Smart power is the combination of soft and hard power to gain a 
functioning foreign policy. In this project, normative power will be used as the soft power 
dimension of smart power.  
 
Actions 
Actions should be understood as EU’s choice of behaviour in conflict management, and which 
tools they choose to use. In this project EU’s actions is limited to coercive diplomacy and 
sanctions. Coercive diplomacy is a technique where an actor tries to influence a conflicts 
development, with either the use of inducements, threats or limited use of punishment 
simultaneously with diplomatic negotiations. Sanctions is a state or organisation based decision 
involving a deliberate withdrawal of economic or diplomatic relations with a country or 
individual, depending on whether it is a comprehensive or targeted sanction. 
 
Conflict management 
The strategy and actions of an actor, who chooses to intervene in a conflict with the aim of 
affecting the development or dissolution. Conflict management is built on the use of different 
tools, which can vary from very soft diplomatic negotiations, to hard intervention with the use of 
force.  
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1.4 Explanation of structure and research questions 
To examine the interrelation of the EU’s powers it is first necessary to determine its individual 
capacity of hard power including both economic and military aspects, as well as normative 
power, based on Ian Manners’ understanding thereof. Following, the analysis of the interrelation 
of powers will be focused on the understanding of these power capacities in relation to Joseph 
Nye’s term smart power. The second research question is based on the EU’s strategy in conflict 
management and how the utilisation of coercive diplomacy and sanctions is connected in this 
strategy. The analysis examines the EU’s strategy for the use of coercive diplomacy from 
Alexander George’s theory on a successful coercive diplomacy strategy, and the use of sanctions 
from Chantal Oudraat’s theory on a successful sanction strategy. The analysis of the relation is 
built on when and how coercive diplomacy and sanctions become relational, and whether and if 
so why this relation is beneficial in a conflict management strategy. The third and last research 
question examines EU’s powers through its actions in a contemporary conflict between Ukraine 
and Russia. First, the background of the conflict is clarified, to give an understanding of the 
conditions for the EU’s actions which are analysed through the theoretical strategies for 
successful coercive diplomacy and sanctions. Last, the analysis of EU’s actions in the conflict is 
related to the theoretical framework of normative and smart power, and how these actions 
directly affect the EU’s hold of these powers. This is followed up in the discussion where the 
example with Russia and Ukraine is discussed against the conclusions from research question 
one and two, to discuss the interplay of EU’s powers in their actions, and not only strategy, in 
conflict management. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Delimitation 
Our focus will be a post-Lisbon treaty perspective on EU’s conflict management. Thereby, we 
only examine previous events and institutional developments at a minimum level, even though 
we accept that these have an influence on EU’s current behaviour in international affairs. The 
internal institutions that the EU consists of, and the dualistic relationship between the EU and the 
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member states3, undoubtedly affect EU’s actions in conflict management. However, because the 
focus of this project is on the external collective role of EU’s conflict management, and which 
powers this consist of, we delimit this project from a deeper focus on the internal institutions and 
the member states. 
We will also delimit this project from a deeper and more comprehensive approach on EU’s 
economy, finance and trade policies, and only include these factors in regard to how these 
policies can become power. Following this we delimit the project from a deeper analytic 
approach to other tools in conflict management such as soft diplomacy, mediation, civilian and 
humanitarian missions, preventive and post state building. Because of our external focus in this 
project we delimit us from analysing the internal dynamics in Ukraine. Furthermore we delimit 
this project from Russia's perception of the conflict and their foreign policy strategy. Our focus is 
strictly limited to EU’s approach and behaviour in the conflict. 
 
2.2 Methodological choices 
We aim to analyse and discuss the powers that influence and determine EU’s behaviour in 
conflict management. We argue, that there exist external structures which influence EU’s powers 
which create complexity. In relation to this, we argue that our subject is context dependent, why 
an example is chosen to give a deeper and more comprehensive focus on EU’s behaviour in 
conflict management. Therefore, our conclusions in this project will be based on both our 
theoretical discussion and the exemplification with the actions in the Ukrainian conflict. We 
reject the claim that it is possible to make a clear and complete set of criteria that defines EU’s 
behaviour in conflicts. Rather we emphasise that many factors can change the underlying 
structures of EU’s conflict management, why we mainly use updated empirical data. This 
enables us to understand the deeper terms and conditions for EU’s behaviour, while remaining 
conscious that our generalisation is based on our exemplification. 
 
                                                 
3
 See Literature review page 4-6 for deeper methodological reflections on the relationship between EU and the 
member states and the perception of EU as one actor. 
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2.3 Theoretical choices 
Our theoretical choices reflect the problem formulation, and therefore focus on the external 
aspects of the EU. We have chosen four theories on this subject, two concerning powers and two 
concerning conflict management tools. 
To analyse the EU’s power capabilities, we have included Ian Manner’s concept of normative 
power along with Joseph Nye’s concept of smart power. Smart power will contribute to an 
understanding of the interplay between hard power and normative power. 
We are aware of the difference between normative power and the term soft power as used in 
Nye’s concept, but we argue that normative power has some of the same characteristics when 
being used in conflict management.    
In order to analyse the EU’s power tools in conflict management, we have included Alexander 
George’s concept of coercive diplomacy along with Chantel Oudraat’s approach to sanctions in 
conflict management. Sanctions is a way of utilising the coercion needed in coercive diplomacy, 
and is one of EU’s most popular coercion tools, which makes these two concepts relevant in 
relation to EU’s approach to conflict management. We are aware that these concept has different 
criteria for success and that those criteria might not be in compliance with EU’s criteria for 
success. In our project, we have chosen to analyse EU’s utilisation of these concepts through the 
criteria for success set out by George and Oudraat in the concepts of coercive diplomacy and 
sanctions. We are also aware that the chosen criteria by George and Oudraat are not definitive, 
because other factors and criteria can be equally important in effective use of coercive diplomacy 
and sanctions. All of our four theoretical positions will be combined in chapter 6 in order to 
discuss how the interplay between EU’s different powers affects its action in relation to the 
current conflict in Ukraine. 
 
2.4 Empirical choices 
The empirical data in this project is primarily qualitative data based on academic books, reports 
and official documents regarding the subject of EU’s foreign policy. Our empirical background 
is based on already existing knowledge concerning EU’s power and conflict management. The 
empirical data we include in our analysis is mainly from primary sources. Our first and second 
research questions will include both official and non-official documents from the EU in order to 
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analyse its overall power strategy and conflict management tools. The documents are derived 
from EU’s own official channels of information. We are aware of the issues when analysing 
mainly through documents from EU, the analysis could leave out alternative and critical 
perspectives. However, we argue that when analysing EU’s overall external strategy and toolset, 
it is the best source for this information. In addition to EU documents, we include Francesco 
Giumelli’s division of targeted measures used by the EU, Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen’s report 
concerning the Ukrainian conflict, Tornike Metreveli and his critical examination of EU’s 
normative power in the conflict, Molly Krasnodebska and her analyse of EU’s normative and 
hard powers in the conflict and lastly Hiski Haukkala’s analysis of the normative relationship 
between the EU and Russia. 
 
 
3. Theory 
3.1 Normative Power 
In 2002, Ian Manners developed the term normative power. The term was created to alter the 
focus from a pure capabilities perspective to a more ideational one, when studying the EU. 
Manners argues, that normative power is the ability to shape what passes for normal in 
international relations (Manners, 2002: 32). Furthermore, he argues that the EU through its 
progress has developed a normative basis consisting of five core values: Peace, liberty, 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights. These five values have been persistent throughout 
the declarations, treaties, policies and conditions from the EU (ibid: 32). Therefore the normative 
power of the EU lies in ensuring, that those aforementioned values becomes fundamental in the 
international debate and something other countries and international organisations strive to 
achieve. 
Manners argues that EU’s normative power comes from six factors: Contagion, informational, 
procedural, transference, overt and cultural filter. He places the six factors in two categories; 
symbolic normative power (power by example) and substantive normative power (power by 
relations). Contagion is a form of unintentional and symbolic form of norm diffusion to other 
political actors, e.g. when the EU is a positive example of regional integration. Informational 
diffusion of norms is largely symbolic and originates from policy initiatives and different sorts of 
communication from the union. Procedural norm diffusion focuses more on substantial 
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normative power. Procedural normative power happens in the relationship between the EU and 
another actor or international organisation. Transference is largely a substantive form of power, 
which takes place with the exchange of goods, trade, aid, etc. The result of transference diffusion 
could be the exportation of norms and standards. Overt diffusion involves both symbolic and 
substantial normative power. It occurs with the presence of the European Union in non-EU 
states, like delegations and embassies of member states. The last factor of norm diffusion is EU’s 
cultural filter. It focuses on the non-EU states’ acceptance, adaptation or rejection of the 
international norms and is therefore based on the interplay between construction of knowledge 
and the formation of political and social identity in the non-EU states (ibid: 35). 
Because of the lack of physical violence and the importance of cultural diffusion of norms in 
these factors, Manners argues that the most important factor shaping EU’s role in international 
relations, is not what it does or what it says, but what it is (Manners, 2006: 184). Manners 
therefore argues that the EU is a normative actor by default and not through its economic or 
military powers. Manners however continues his argument by stating that militarization of the 
EU, does not necessarily leads to a lessening of EU’s normative power, but the process has to be 
characterized by critical reflection and a scope of proportionality, rather than the pursuit of great 
power (ibid: 183). Manners distinguishes between normative basis and normative power. 
According to Manners, the spread of these values need to be anchored in the norms itself, and 
not in any form of power assertion, to become normative power. The spread of normative values 
can be helped by coercion, either through economic or military force. However, the imposition 
of normative values through economic or military force cannot be equated with successfully 
changing the normative principles of others merely through normative power (Manners, 2002: 
32; Diez & Manners, 2007: 175-176). 
Manners’ claim of EU as a normative power has been debated and criticized by a range of 
scholars as Sjursen (2006), Merlinge (2007) Young (2010) and Kugel (2012). The critique has 
been that it is empirically difficult to investigate the relation between normative power and 
power at a macro-level, and that Manners neglects strategic and rationalist agendas usually 
triumphs the normative (Merlinge, 2007: 435-440; Sjursen, 2006: 236-237). 
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3.2 Smart power 
The term smart power was developed by Joseph Nye in 2003. The argument is that soft power 
cannot produce a functioning foreign policy alone and it therefore has to be combined with hard 
power (Nye, 2009A). Soft power lies within the use of tools that creates attraction such as 
communication, emotional intelligence and vision, while hard power tools include coercing with 
threats or inducing with payments4 (Nye, 2009B: 18). Nye argues that without attraction no actor 
is strong enough to coerce another actor. The most effective foreign policy is therefore a mix of 
hard and soft power tools. Nye underlines that soft power tools are most important, but is more 
effective in combination with bargaining, bullying, buying and hard-nosed negotiations. Nye 
argues that every context in negotiations is different, especially in crisis situations, and the 
balance in the smart power must be adapted to its purpose (ibid: 18). This is done by contextual 
intelligence. Contextual intelligence has an objective to create smart strategies and is an intuitive 
diagnostic skill used by policymakers in the development of tactics. This process should start 
with an understanding of the limits and strengths of an actor’s power (Nye, 2009A). Nye 
furthermore says that contextual intelligence is the ability to shape an event by being able to 
adapt and balance the feasible and desirable, and actors need to use the flow of events to 
implement strategies (Nye, 2008: 88). 
The main critic of Nye has been from Zahran & Ramos (2010), Layne (2010) and is that smart 
power is closer to a political strategy than a definable and exact power, because the term consist 
of a mix between hard and soft power. Smart ‘power’ thereby becomes a blurred composition 
between behaviours, resources and strategy and not similar to hard and soft power (Biegon, 
2013: 6-8). 
 
3.3 Coercive Diplomacy 
Alexander George (1991) developed the theory and method of coercive diplomacy as an 
effective and attractive tool in foreign policy. The basic idea is that for an actor to change a 
target’s behaviour, it needs a combination of good diplomatic skills and the use of threat or a 
limited amount of force. George believes it is an attractive strategy because of the low costs and 
possibilities of big results, compared to use of force with high costs and results (George, 1991: 3-
                                                 
4 For further explanation of the term soft power see Literature Review page 6 
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6). George has four success criteria for states to succeed with coercive diplomacy. First, the 
coercer needs to communicate clearly, what it wants from the target. Second, it is important to 
create a sense of urgency with the target. Third, it should set up a clear and credible threat or 
limited punishment. Fourth, it should give positive rewards, or at least pretend to, if the target 
complies (ibid: 7). Finally George derives a range of conditions that favour coercive diplomacy. 
The coercer has to accept potential costs and risks when using coercive diplomacy, has to show 
strong leadership, gather national and international support and appear committed to use force 
upon the target. These conditions will in this project be labelled as a fifth success criterion (ibid: 
77-78). In regards to the five success criteria, George identifies three main strategies when states 
engage in coercive diplomacy. First strategy is to issue an ultimatum, either explicit or implicit, 
with a clear red line and a deadline which will cause punishment. Second strategy is also to issue 
an ultimatum, but without a certain urgency, to wait and see how the target will react before 
deciding to take further and more comprehensive action. The last strategy is to “turn the screw” 
where the pressure and threats on the target will gradually rise over time, or at least the coercer 
communicate that its demand has a long-term perspective (ibid: 7-9). 
In reality, however, coercive diplomacy is difficult to use successfully, and George identifies a 
range of factors that could affect a state's use of coercive diplomacy. Multiple coercers or 
multiple targets can complicate the situation because it can be hard for the actors to agree on a 
political strategy. Another factor is that the target can counter, or believe it can counter, the 
coercer and use counter-coercion, which complicates the situation even more (ibid: 69-70). 
 
3.4 Sanctions 
Economic sanctions are a tool in conflict management defined as a mean between words and 
war, which both states and international organizations uses. Chantal Oudraat (2007) argues that 
there has happened a change in the type of sanctions from comprehensive sanctions which target 
the entire economy with e.g. a prohibition on all import or export, to targeted sanctions which 
focusses on specific personals, goods or services instead. She claims that the change has made 
the use of sanctions more effective, because it also changed the sanctions strategic goal from 
trying to reverse the policies provoking violence and conflict, to focusing on irritating the target 
as well as limiting its possible positive outcome instead (Oudraat, 2007: 335-338). Oudraat 
follows up on this argument by setting up five criteria, which a state needs to fulfil if it wants a 
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successful sanction strategy. First, there is a need for judging the targets strengths and 
weaknesses, why there is a need for a full understanding of its economic, social and political 
characteristics. Second, the state has to examine the possibilities of succeeding with the use of 
either comprehensive or targeted sanctions, and define its objectives from this examination. After 
these two are clear, the state should choose its tactic, which according to Oudraat can be either 
immediate and comprehensive or gradually and incrementally imposed. The fourth criterion 
focuses on the evaluation and implementation, which include both analysing possible problems 
with third-party involvement and finding solutions on these if any. Last, the state should set a 
time limit on the sanction, and review the first four criteria again after this time has gone by. If 
there has been no political effect, the outside powers should either encourage the target to good 
behaviour by promising to lift parts of the sanction, or threat it with the use of force or thereby 
increase the pressure of the sanctions (ibid: 343-346). 
 
4. What is the interrelation between the EU’s hard and normative 
power? 
The following chapter will analyse the interrelation between the EU’s hard and normative power. 
The hard power section will analyse how economic and military capacity creates EU’s hard 
power capability. The normative power section will be used to analyse the extent of EU’s 
normative power. Finally, the last section will compare the two different forms of power and 
how they are being combined in the use of smart power. 
 
4.1 EU’s hard power 
Hard power involves the use of an actor’s military or economic capabilities to influence the 
behaviour of another actor, which can be used as an inducement or as a threat (Nye, 2003). EU's 
economic power is very dependent on EU’s internal single market5. The market has 500 million 
consumers with an GDP per head of € 25.000 (Europa.eu, 2014A) and EU’s most important 
economic role is to protect the single market (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 62). The main purpose 
of the single market is to improve the efficiency in the trade-sector through free movement of 
                                                 
5
 See Literature Review page 2 
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people, money, goods and services. That gives the EU member states an opportunity to trade 
with each other at a very low cost, while non-EU members has to make a trade agreement with 
the EU or pay tariffs to trade with the member states (Europa.eu, 2012). 
The size of EU’s economy has made it one of the most important and influential economies in 
the world (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 87). The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) secures that 
the EU has the capacity to act and react in international trading, and by optimising their trade 
policy the EU tries to ensure that they can do it as a single economic entity (ibid: 88). The single 
market gives EU the possibility to use access to the market as a negotiation tool within the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and with the individual countries themselves (ibid: 88). The CCP 
belongs in the category of exclusive competences, which underpins EU’s united possibilities to 
act and react in economic matters (Garcia & Garmendia, 2012: 59). 
With the Treaty of Lisbon the EU created a common legal personality which gave the Union the 
right to become a member of international organisations and to negotiate and sign agreements in 
policy areas, where the member states has submitted its sovereignty (Europa.eu, 2014B). 
Therefore, EU acts as a united union in WTO where both the EU itself and the individual 
member states are important members of the organisation. The size of EU’s economy gives the 
EU’s mandate in WTO a powerful and influential voice which often affects the outcome of 
WTO’s common trade policies which controls, optimizes and regulates the world trade 
(Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 86). 
One of EU’s conflict management tools is the use of sanctions. EU’s large economic capabilities 
give them the opportunity to make effective economic and financial sanctions. The extent of 
EU’s influence on the world trade, through WTO and through the size of their internal market, 
can be seen as a contributing factor on how large an impact the sanction can have on the target. 
The increased common position in EU’s foreign matters has underpinned the possibility to use 
and implement sanctions (Garcia & Garmendia, 2012: 59). 
Another way of using hard power in conflict management is through the use of military force. 
The EU and its member states possesses and have throughout the Union’s existence possessed a 
significant degree of military capabilities, and collectively EU is spending around 200 billion 
euros on defence every year, only surpassed by the United States. It is the member states who 
primarily are spending money and whom has the military capabilities which they can contribute 
with in EU missions (Young, 2010: 79-80). The EU has several Battlegroups which is a coalition 
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of military capabilities from different member states that can be used as a rapid military 
instrument if decided by the Council (European Union External Action, 2013). The Battlegroups 
gives EU the possibility to act as an united union when it comes to the use of force. 
Supplementary to the EU’s own military capabilities, EU and NATO signed the Berlin Plus 
Agreement in 2003 which allows the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities in EU led crisis 
management operations (EEAS, 2014A). The Lisbon Treaty created a framework for permanent 
structured cooperation, The European External Action Service and combined the title/role of 
high representative with a vice presidency of the European Commission. In addition, the 
Petersberg tasks were expanded to include military assistance tasks, stabilisation tasks and joint 
disarmament tasks. These changes are made to improve the effectiveness of EU’s external 
actions and to give the EU a more assertive role in security and defence (EEAS, 2012). 
To sum up EU’s hard power is mainly based on their large single market which can be used both 
as an inducement and a threat. EU’s large economic capability creates a strong basis for the EU 
to execute sanctions or incentives. Especially since the Treaty of Lisbon the EU has optimised 
their foreign and security policy which not only has ensured the opportunities to make effective 
sanctions but also has increased the military dimension of hard power. 
 
4.2 EU’s normative power 
In chapter 3 it was established that Manners considers EU’s normative basis to consist of five 
particular values; Peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The normative 
basis found by Manners in 2002 is still central in the construction of EU policy; furthermore the 
promotion of these values is now incorporated into the treaty basis of the Union. The Treaty of 
Lisbon states that the European Union is “(...) founded on the values for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights (...)” (2007/C 306/01, art 2), and that 
“(...) the unions aim is to promote peace and its values (...)” (2007/C 306/01, art 3). 
Furthermore, it was established that these five values were diffused to other states through six 
factors: Contagion, informational, procedural, transference, overt and cultural filter. 
Contagion is not a factor which has changed largely since the Lisbon Treaty. The EU still stands 
for regional integration. Even though some countries internally in the Union has expressed its 
concern with the amount of integration, e.g. through the election to the EU Parliament in the 
spring 2014 where EU sceptic parties was elected all over Europe (France24, 2014). Still no 
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other political union in the world is close to the amount of regional integration as the EU (Roy & 
Domínguez, 2005: 6). A clear example of informational diffusion of norms can be seen in the 
EU's reaction to the Arab spring in 2011. On March the 8th 2011, the European Commission 
issued a joint communication regarding a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with 
the Southern Mediterranean. The communication presents a joint approach to the institutional 
changes in the Arab countries and emphasizes the need for focus on democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law (Ashton & the European Commission, 2011A: 2). The approach from the EU 
introduces a step change which commits the partners to specific measurable reforms which the 
support from the EU will depend on. If a country is effective and extensive in its reformation of 
the political system, the support and trade agreements from the EU will be extensive as well, 
with democracy being the entry qualification to the partnership (Ashton & the European 
Commission, 2011B: 5). Procedural diffusion comes with institutionalisation of relationship with 
other actors; a way for the EU to do this is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP 
policy was first developed in 2004 but was reviewed, optimised and expanded following the 
Arab spring in May 2011 with the joint communication of a new response to a changing 
neighbourhood. One of the primary changes in the renewed strategy for the ENP is the more for 
more principle (EEAS, 2014B). Like in the communication of partnership for democracy and 
shared prosperity this means that, the further a country adapts the values set out by the EU, the 
closer the integration with EU and the support from the Union will be. Another way of 
enhancing EUs procedural norm diffusion is the common legal personality established with the 
Lisbon Treaty. This means that the EU has the right to become a member of international 
organisations. The EU has since become an enhanced observer in the UN which gives all but 
voting rights to the Union (EU delegation to the UN, 2014). 
An example of transference diffusion of norms can be located in the Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (IcSP) launched in 2014. The IcSP gives EU the possibility of supporting 
third parties in a crisis situation, when an adequate response cannot be provided from other EU 
sources (Reg. No 230/2014, art 2.3, art.2.5). It focuses on providing financial and technical 
assistance in situations of urgency, crisis, emerging crisis or situations posing a threat to 
democracy, law and order, human rights and fundamental freedoms or security of individuals 
(Reg. No 230/2014, art 3.1 (a)(b)). 
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Overt diffusion has taken a significant step with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Notably with the expansion of the missions covered by the Petersberg tasks6. The EU missions in 
the Sahel region are a clear example of this. Following the French intervention in Mali in 
January 2013, the EU launched a training mission for Malian armed forces in April 2014 (EEAS, 
2014C) which would be considered a military advice and assistance task, incorporated in the 
Petersberg tasks with the Lisbon Treaty. 
The last factor for EU's diffusion of norms is cultural filter which focuses on the adaption of the 
norms set out by the EU. A positive outcome of such diffusion can be seen in Moldova’s 
legislation process concerning LGBT rights. On July the 12th 2013 Moldova secretly passed an 
anti-propaganda law, but with the law breaching European convention on human rights and 
Moldova’s active pursuit of closer cooperation and perhaps inauguration into the Union, the law 
was later annulled (EP intergroup for LGBT rights, 2013). 
Based on the above, the normative basis of the Union is consistent and is now even explicitly 
stated in the Treaty with a following commitment to export those values. In the analysis three 
different forms of norm diffusion was found based on Manners six factors. First, norm diffusion 
by default (contagion), this means the spread of normative values without coercion of any sort 
but through example. Second, norm diffusion through coercion, in these examples through 
economic incentives or military and civilian presence and support (informational, procedural, 
transference and overt). And third a mixture between the two (cultural filter), because it is 
difficult to determine whether it is EU’s values or the economic incentive which attracts 
Moldova. 
 
4.3 EU’s smart power 
According to Nye, soft power is the most important form of power and hard power should be 
used as a complementary instrument. Despite the emphasis on a primarily soft power approach, 
Nye stresses that the combination of both forms of power into a smart power strategy, is 
desirable and will enhance the possibility of success in a given conflict. 
                                                 
6 The Petersberg tasks were expanded to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations, military advice 
and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilisation tasks (EEAS, 2014D). 
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Four of the six examples from the above analysis involves the direct use of hard power 
capabilities, with three of the four examples, being mainly economic incentives. When taken into 
account that all the examples in the factors have been either established or revised with the 
Treaty of Lisbon or after, it suggests an enhanced focus on the utilisation of hard power. 
According to Nye’s theory this would be an example of the EU increasing its smart power. 
Based on article two and three in the Treaty of Lisbon it may be argued that the smart power 
approach has the purpose of promoting the Unions normative basis. 
If focusing on Manners definition of the term normative power, the focus on spreading these 
values might be harmful for the normative power itself. According to Manners the spread of 
normative values has to be anchored in the norm itself for it to be successful normative power 
and distinguishable from other forms of power. 
The possibility of more frequent deployment of military and civilian missions by the EU could, 
according to international relations scholar Thomas Diez, have the consequence that EU’s 
normative power becomes less distinguishable from other power forms. However, Diez would 
still argue that hard power capabilities can be used to back up the spread of normative values 
(Diez, 2005: 621). In a joint paper by Diez and Manners from 2007, they address the interplay 
between normative power and hard power capabilities. They determine that normative power 
cannot rely primarily on military or economic coercion, but that the different types of power can 
go together (Diez & Manners, 2007: 176). However, our analysis suggests that it is not the hard 
power coercion which supports the normative power, but the other way around. Four of the six 
examples, consists of hard power capabilities with the purpose of promoting the normative basis 
of the European Union. This suggests that according to Manners and Diez’ normative power 
theory, the EU is not exercising its normative power, but rather using hard power capabilities to 
promote its normative values through smart power. This complies with Nye’s concept of smart 
power and would be described by Nye as the best possible strategy.  
 
4.4 Partial conclusion 
EU’s hard and normative power is interrelated. According to Nye’s concept of smart power, 
EU’s combination of hard and normative power is a rational strategy, because it enhances the 
possibility of reaching the external policy goals set out by the union. Through Manners 
normative power theory we have argued that EU’s focus on hard power, makes the normative 
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power hard to distinguish from other types of power. Further, we have argued that EU’s smart 
power approach is used to diffuse the Union’s normative values, primarily through hard power 
capabilities. 
 
 
5. How is coercive diplomacy and sanctions related in the EU’s 
conflict management strategy? 
The following chapter will analyse how coercive diplomacy and sanctions are used as tools in 
EU’s conflict management, both independent and interrelated. The first section will shortly 
describe and analyse the Lisbon Treaty’s impact on EU’s conflict management. Next will be an 
analysis of ‘European Union’s Security Strategy’, which creates the framework for the Unions 
conflict management, based on George’s theory of coercive diplomacy. Afterwards we will 
analyse the EU’s strategy on the use of sanctions through EU’s official sanction policies and 
Oudraat’s theory on sanctions. Our two analysis of EU’s use of coercive diplomacy and 
sanctions will lead us to an integrated analysis of how both tools are related in EU’s conflict 
management. 
 
5.1. EU’s coercive diplomacy 
The perception of EU as a non-military actor was created in the 1960’s, when the union decided 
not to incorporate defence and security in its foreign policy. Instead, the EU has incorporated 
diplomacy at different levels in the Union's foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 
10-11). The success however has been debated and disputed, and a central argument has been the 
lack of a coherent foreign policy in the EU (Dover, 2013: 241). With the Lisbon Treaty EU’s 
foreign policy were reformed through the establishment of a High Representative of the Union 
Common Foreign and Security Affairs (High Representative) which became assisted by the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). The High Representative has the responsibility of 
bringing together diplomatic, economic and military sectors in the union (ibid: 250). The EEAS 
became the diplomatic framework of the Union with the aim to harmonize the foreign policy of 
member states and the EU. The two key instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
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(CFSP) are common positions or joint actions. Common positions are used in order to harmonize 
the member states foreign policy, and are mainly used when utilising coercive diplomacy. Joint 
Actions are issued in EU-operations where civilian or military personnel are deployed, and are  
mainly used in security and defence matters (ibid: 244). The Council describes the strategically 
changes of the Lisbon Treaty as “We must strengthen our own coherence, through better 
institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.” (Council, 2008A: 1). According to the EU, the 
Treaty is significant in changing the EU towards being a more coherent actor, which is necessary 
in order to conduct successful coercive diplomacy. George’s first criterion is for the coercer to 
communicate clearly what the objective are, and how it can be achieved through coercion of the 
target. This criterion require for the EU to act coherent through common positions in order to 
avoid creating miscommunication and miscalculation when conducting coercive diplomacy.  
The EU’s conflict management range from soft version of diplomacy and mediation with 
consensus dialogue, to a more comprehensive coercive communication and diplomacy approach 
where the tools are threats based on economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.  
There exists, however, a military dimension when the EU is exercising coercive diplomacy. As 
earlier concluded in chapter 4, the EU possess military capacities through both its member states, 
and its strong relationship with NATO. These military factors will implicitly effect EU’s 
utilisation of coercive diplomacy.  
In the EU’s Security Strategy it is described how key threats as terrorism, proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime should be 
approached by the Union. The Strategy states that “In contrast to the massive visible threat in 
the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely 
military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.” (Council, 2003A: 7) and further states 
that the instruments include export controls, political and economic pressure and military assets 
(ibid: 7). The term political and economic pressure correlate with George’s third criterion, where 
it is necessary for the coercer to set up a threat against the target, which this indicates is possible 
for the EU to use. Political pressure also corresponds with the EU’s use of diplomatic pressure 
and isolation in order to change a target’s behaviour. The Security Strategy states that: 
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“(...) some [countries ed.] have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. 
It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should 
be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is 
a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.” (ibid: 10).  
 
This indicates that the EU is willing to use its diplomatic network and reputation as an integrated 
part of the international system, as a coercive measure. The EU can use its diplomatic efforts to 
get a country out of international diplomatic isolation if it chooses to comply with EU’s 
demands. Opposite the Security Strategy indicates that the EU can isolate a country 
diplomatically if the target does not comply with the demands. 
Another example of a clear association between the EU and the use of coercive diplomacy in 
conflict management is through the EU’s strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. The EU in the right context and circumstances are allowed to use political and 
diplomatic measures through dialogue, pressure and export control. These can further be 
hardened through United Nations Charter VII with sanctions, interceptions of shipments and an 
appropriate use of force (Council, 2003B: 5). 
The EU aims to act within UN’s framework in order to strengthen UN’s capabilities and 
efficiency. The UN’s Charter is seen as the fundamental framework for global conflict 
management and the EU sees the UN Security Council as responsible for maintaining 
international peace and security (Council, 2003A: 9). The interrelation between the EU and UN 
in conflict management correlates with George’s fifth criterion, where the coercer needs 
international support for its action. The EU corresponds with its ambition to integrate its own 
conflict management with the UN’s. By working through an international framework, the EU 
could gain more international support for its actions and thereby more legitimacy when utilising 
coercive diplomacy. 
 
5.2. EU’s use of sanctions 
The introduction of EU’s use of autonomous sanctions without UN mandate was evolved in 
1981, and was followed by different institutional changes, including a set of common and 
specific regulations incorporated with the Maastricht treaty in 1992 (Kreutz, 2005: 9). In these 
years, the use of sanctions developed into a key tool for the EU in conflict management, but it 
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was not until the creation of the ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures 
(Sanctions)’ with an actual strategy and target list in March 2004, that the EU started to promote 
the use of sanctions over interventions (ibid: 11-12). 
The implementation of these ‘Basic Principles’ meant an institutional setting for EU’s use of 
sanctions or restrictive measures as the EU prefers to refer to them as. The principles state that 
the UN is the primary actor in regards to sanctions, but that the EU can employ them as well, 
though preferably with a UN-mandate. Furthermore, the principles state that sanctions when 
implemented should be context based, as well as being reviewed and followed up regularly. 
Moreover, the EU should consider sanctions as a part of a comprehensive policy combined with 
political dialogue, incentives and conditionality (Council, 2004: 1-3). Compared to Oudraat’s 
criterion one, two and five this reflects that the EU understands the importance of knowing the 
target, defining the objectives and having a time limit on the sanction. Besides this it states, that 
the EU does not see sanctions as something that can stand alone in a conflict management 
strategy. 
Oudraat also argues that the primary type of sanctions used today is targeted sanctions, which is 
consistent with the ‘Basic Principles’ declaration of targeted measures being the focus of EU’s 
sanction policy. Francesco Giumelli (2013) divides these targeted measures being used by the 
EU into four categories; arms embargoes, travel bans, economic measures and financial 
measures (Giumelli, 2013: 22). 
The first measure, arms embargo, is EU’s second most used sanction and consist of the 
prohibition of selling weapons and related services imposed on entire countries, regions and 
actors. The popularity is due to its relatively harmless nature, and can therefore easier be 
accepted by the public debate. Secondly, the EU can use a travel ban, which imposes a 
prohibition of travelling into or through EU’s territory, and because this only creates 
inconvenience and discomfort for the individual target, it is the most common EU sanction. The 
third most common is the financial sanctions, which refers to freezing assets by e.g. seizing bank 
accounts, prohibiting financial transactions and denying loans to central banks. Last and rarest is 
the use of economic sanctions by the EU, which concerns prohibition of trade on specific goods 
or services. Guimelli argues, that it is important for the analysis to distinguish between these, 
because the implementation of one sanction over another will have varying outcomes (ibid: 22-
24). In relation to specifically targeted sanctions the Council developed a document titled ‘Best 
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Practices for effective implementation of restrictive measures in 2008’. Hereby the EU takes the 
fourth of Oudraat’s criterion into consideration in regards to its sanctions policy. The fourth 
criterion builds on ensuring evaluation and implementation, which is exactly what the EU tries to 
make easier and smarter with this document including both structures on identifying the right 
individuals and modalities for freezing assets (Council, 2008B). This actually confirms that the 
CFSP includes all of Oudraat’s five criteria in its strategy for use of sanctions. According to 
Oudraat’s claim, the EU thereby forms its strategy in the best strategically way, even though it 
does not have an official collected sanction strategy document. The closest to this is the 
informational overview document ‘Sanctions or restrictive measures’ developed by the 
Commission in 2008. This paper includes a last aspect of the strategy, which is in relation to 
EU’s normative power elaborated in chapter 4. It claims that EU’s sanctions must be within the 
framework of human rights and fundamental freedoms, even in regards to targeted individuals 
basic human needs. This document finally states that the ‘Basic Principles’ and ‘Best Practices’ 
are two key documents when examining EU’s restrictive measures, but neither of them 
thoroughly take into account what relation sanctions have with coercive diplomacy 
(Commission, 2008). 
 
5.3. The relation between coercive diplomacy and sanctions 
As previously mentioned in chapter 3.3 George argues that for coercive diplomacy to succeed, 
the diplomatic negotiations needs to be backed up by a clear and credible threat or limited 
punishment. For the EU this threat or punishment has been implemented through different forms 
of sanctions, which is why EU’s coercive diplomacy is dependent on the implementation of 
sanctions against the target. Through the Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures 
(Sanctions), the EU states that: 
 
“The Council is committed to using sanctions as part of an integrated, comprehensive policy 
approach which should include political dialogue, incentives, conditionality and could even 
involve, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter.” 
(Council, 2004: 2). 
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Sanctions as a part of a comprehensive policy correlate with the basic ideas of coercive 
diplomacy, where both diplomacy and threats or limited use of force should be combined in 
order to achieve EU’s own interests. The EU uses “coercive measures” as a last resort, which 
opens up for the possibility of conducting a comprehensive coercive diplomatic approach in 
conflict management. EU’s use of sanctions as its main tool when utilising coercive diplomacy 
can be described by two softer arguments and one more practical and rational arguments. 
First, the EU uses sanctions in coercive diplomacy because of ethical reasons. There still exists a 
common perception of sanctions as more human and civilized compared to only a limited 
amount of military force. Targeted sanctions are used mainly to hit individuals and the 
government, and not civilians, for example through the use of freezing assets (Oudraat, 2007: 
338-340). This perception harmonises with EU’s own identification as a normative power, with 
respect for human rights and as a peace promoter. Secondly, sanctions are an acknowledged and 
recognized tool by the UN, who also practices them in conflict management (ibid: 339). An UN-
mandated sanction is an important factor for the EU when choosing sanctions as a tool, because 
the EU wishes to comply with UN in as many foreign policy matters as possible. George’s fifth 
criterion, which claims that the coercer needs to accept the potential risk of actions by gaining 
international support and appear committed to use force, accentuates the EU’s sanctions strategy. 
First of all the coercer has to accept, that if the target does not comply with the coercers 
demands, it has to either realise the threats or do nothing in accordance to the threats, but expect 
a loss in legitimacy. This is important because of the difference in the potential risk a coercer 
must be willing to take, when choosing military force as the threat instead of sanctions, because 
warfare not only includes the risk of economic loss, but also greater human suffering than 
sanctions. Furthermore the criterion underlines why the EU as a coercer needs and wants 
international support for its actions in conflict management, and therefore also the importance of 
an UN-mandated sanctions. 
Following these softer arguments for using sanctions, we can also identify a practical and 
rational factor of why sanctions is used more by the EU in conflict management, compared to the 
use of force. Sanctions can be easier to implement gradually through the different levels. It is 
easy to expand from one targeted measure, like travel ban, towards a more comprehensive 
strategy including also arms embargo, economic and financial sanctions. While it can be argued 
that the use of force also can be implemented gradually through different levels, it is worth 
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noticing the chance and risk of escalating the conflict into full-scale war in this matter. The 
common idea of coercive diplomacy is to solve conflicts with only limited amount of force, and 
not escalate into war between coercer and target (George, 1991: XII). Therefore, the lower 
chances of war contribute to making sanctions as a coercive measure attractive for the EU. 
 
5.4 Partial conclusion 
These three different arguments thereby lead to the conclusion that sanctions and coercive 
diplomacy are related in EU’s conflict management. The connection exists in the official 
documents, where the ‘Basic Principles’ makes the direct connection. Besides this the relation is 
mainly build on the need for threats when using coercive diplomacy, as well as the effect of the 
use of sanctions over force as this threat. EU’s use of sanctions as a coercive measure in conflict 
management is therefore their main and most preferred coercive tool. In relation to our problem 
formulation, the connection of these tools and EU’s combination of normative values and hard 
power measures will be discussed through the idea of a smart power strategy in the example of 
the Ukrainian conflict. 
 
 
6. How is the EU acting in the Ukrainian conflict in relation to its 
powers? 
The first section will shortly introduce the conflict between Ukraine, Russia and the EU. Next 
will be an account for the diplomatic measures exercised by the EU which will be analysed with 
an outline in George’s theory regarding coercive diplomacy. Afterwards, Oudraat’s criteria will 
be used to study the sanctions implemented by the EU. Continuing a discussion regarding the 
internal disagreements about the strategy behind the sanctions will follow, this section will 
combine the viewpoints of George and Oudraat. Last, a discussion about the role of normative 
power in the Ukrainian conflict will be done in perspective to Nye’s smart power concept. 
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6.1 Introduction to the Ukrainian conflict 
The Ukrainian crisis began when Yanukovich's government rejected an association agreement 
with the EU in November 2013 which triggered an uprising in Kiev. After three months of 
protest the government collapsed, Yanukovich fled to Russia, and a new transition government, 
positive towards the EU, was installed. Russia's response to the government coup was harsh and 
pro-Russian militias together with Russian support annexed Crimea in March 2014 (Larsen, 
2014: 7). The conflict escalated further when fighting erupted in the eastern parts of Ukraine 
where pro-Russian militants took control of several major cities in the region. Russia was 
accused of supporting the rebels with financial, logistic and military aid (ibid: 7). The EU was 
determined to react towards what they believed was a Russian aggression. While the fighting in 
Eastern Ukraine intensified during the spring of 2014, the government in Kiev ratified the Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU under the Association 
Agreement in June 2014 (ibid: 34). 
 
6.2 EU’s diplomatic strategy towards Russia 
In line with the five success criteria for coercive diplomacy, the EU firstly started with 
communicating what it wanted from the target. The EU demanded that Russia should call back 
their armed forces from Crimea, and underlined that the crisis should be handled through 
negotiations between the Ukrainian government and Russian Federation. Furthermore, the EU 
encourages behaviour change by promising to reengage with Russia if they comply (EU 
Newsroom, 2014). The EU has used coercive diplomatic measures when suspending negotiations 
regarding Russia’s joining of the International Energy Agency and the OECD. Furthermore 
instead of gathering for a G8 meeting in Sochi, a G7 summit, excluding Russia, was held in 
Brussels on June the 4-5th 2014. EU member states have cancelled the regular bilateral summits 
between the EU and Russia, but the Council requested the Commission to reengage in 
cooperation programs where the cooperation is handled on a case to case basis. Civil society and 
cross-border cooperation has also been maintained (ibid). The restrictive measures applied to 
Russia has had an effect on the European economy (DR, 2014), which correspond with the fifth 
criterion, that there are costs using coercive diplomacy which the actor has to accept. However, 
the EU can be criticised regarding the acceptance of the costs, in the sense that the EU has been 
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reluctant to support closer relations with Ukraine, because of the dependence on Russian gas 
(Krasnodębska, 2014). George argues that there are difficulties using coercive diplomacy, this 
was seen in August, where Russia counter-coerced with an import ban on all dairy products, 
meat and vegetables from EU, Norway, US, Australia and Canada (DR, 2014).     
 
6.3 EU’s economic sanctions against Russia 
EU sanctions should be seen as part of a comprehensive policy approach that contains political 
dialogue. According to EU’s official documents on restrictive measures, sanctions should not be 
seen as punitive, but as a foreign policy tool to change the behaviour of a target (Council, 
2014A: 1). On the subject of specific sanctions against Russia, the European Council President, 
Herman Van Rompuy said "Sanctions are not a question of retaliation; they are a foreign policy 
tool. Not a goal in themselves, but a means to an end (...)” (Council, 2014B). 
EU’s economic sanctions against Russia’s involvement in Ukraine started March 17th 2014. 
These sanctions included a travel ban and asset freezes on 21 persons, who were threatening 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Council, 2014C). However, these sanctions did not have the 
desired political effect. Herman Van Rompuy expressed the desired political effect: “(...) our 
goal is to stop Russian action against Ukraine, to restore Ukraine's sovereignty (...)” (Council, 
2014B). According to Oudraat’s fifth criterion, when the desired political effect fails, the outside 
power can choose to increase the pressure of sanctions. Already on March the 21th further 
restrictive measures were applied (ibid). Further travel bans and asset freezes were applied in 
April and May. A significant package of additional restrictive measures was agreed upon in July 
and September 2014. The latest reinforced sanctions came in to function on November the 28th 
2014 (Council, 2014D). Restrictive measures such as assets freeze and visa bans now apply to 
132 persons and 28 entities7. As described in chapter 5.2 such sanctions are the most common 
executed by the EU. Most of the targeted individuals are those whose actions contributed to the 
violation on Ukraine’s integrity, especially in the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of 
a sovereign country. Included in this is the government in Crimea, the new leadership in Donbass 
and the Russian decisions makers. Travel bans and asset freezes also apply to people who 
transact money to separatist groups in the Donbass region. The strategy behind these economic 
                                                 
7
 As of December the 2nd 2014 
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sanctions follows EU’s criteria such as “(...) effectiveness, cost/benefit, balance across sectors 
and Member States, international coordination, reversibility/scalability, legal defensibility/ease 
of enforcement.” (Council, 2014E). In line with Oudraat’s second criterion, this shows how the 
EU has examined the possibilities of succeeding by defining its objectives. The package agreed 
upon in July 2014, was developed to be scaled up in different graduations if necessary, which 
happened in both September and November 2014. According to Oudraat, the outside power 
needs to choose a tactic of either comprehensive or gradual; the EU has in this case chosen to 
impose its sanctions gradually by scaling up if necessary. The package agreed upon in September 
2014 is supposed to give EU the possibility to act within a short time span and be an effective 
strategy towards the goal of changing Russia’s actions in Ukraine (ibid). The sanctions revolve 
around four sectors: Capital market, dual use goods, sensitive technologies and defence (ibid). 
According to Oudraat, the tactic behind sanctions needs to have the targets strengths and 
weaknesses in mind. The EU has used the single market as a power tool to hit Russia’s economy. 
The first packages of sanctions revolved mainly around travel bans and asset freezes, but after 
the shooting down of the MH17 Malaysia airplane the EU has scaled up their measures (Larsen, 
2014: 32). The reinforced measures from September restricts Russia even further from the EU 
capital markets, and shows how the EU is gradually scaling up their sanctions with damaging 
long-term effect on Russia, and with minimal costs for Europe (ibid: 33). Companies and 
nationals in the EU may no longer give loans to five state-owned banks in Russia (Council, 
2014F). This has a damaging effect on Russian growth, because of Russian companies’ 
dependency on western banks. It is prohibited to provide financial instruments including; 
brokering, new trading bonds and equity (ibid). This means investors are moving their assets out 
of Russia, while the threat of further sanctions has been a powerful tool to scare investors to keep 
out of Russia, why the gradual approach is efficiently damaging the Russian economy (Larsen, 
2014: 33). There is embargo on imports and export of arms and nine defence companies in 
Russia may no longer receive military technology from the EU. Furthermore specific services 
within the deep-water oil industry may no longer be supplied from Russia, in retrospect to 
chapter 5.2, the EU rarely executes sanctions on services (Council, 2014F). 
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6.4 Internal disagreements in the strategies behind the sanctions 
Oudraat’s fourth criterion focuses on implementation and evaluation of sanctions. The 
implementation of EU sanctions has to go through a CFSP Council decision which has to be in 
unanimity when implementing the sanctions. This can complicate how fast the EU can react, and 
result in the decision being based on the lowest common denominator, however if succeeded the 
EU can stand as a stronger coherent actor. Certain sanctions such as arms embargo and travel 
bans are though implemented directly by the member states as a common position, (Council, 
2014A: 1), and can in retrospect to Oudraat be seen as one of the solutions developed to make 
the implementation more effective. 
Even though the EU has managed to agree on sanctions against Russia, there still exists a great 
range of disagreements among the member states, about the strategy behind the sanctions.  In 
perspective to George’s three strategies concerning coercive diplomacy there is a split between 
countries that prefer a hard-line sanction policy, with the purpose of punishing Russia 
financially, and those who favour sanctions as a method to get Russia into dialogue (Larsen, 
2014: 31). This also shows an inconsistency between the EU as an institution and the member 
states, understood in the sense that the official documents of the EU explicitly says that the 
sanctions should not be seen as punitive (Council, 2014A: 1). The disagreements about sanctions 
also concern if they should be immediately and comprehensively imposed on Russia to gain a 
new deal between the EU and Russia on the Ukraine dispute, or should be imposed gradually 
with a long-term strategy (Larsen, 2014: 31). This can be problematic in retrospect to George’s 
argument, that coercive diplomacy is only expected to be successful if the actor, in this case the 
EU, can gather national and international support, and actually seems committed to use force 
against the target. George argues that multiple coercers complicate the strategic choices, as seen 
in the split between member states hard and soft line approaches. The common position where 
member states harmonize their foreign policy has therefore not succeeded, which is problematic 
according to George’s first criterion regarding clear communication to the target. However, 
despite these internal disagreements, the EU has seemed to agree on following one tactic when 
acting against Russia. As argued earlier EU’s implementation of sanctions towards Russia has 
increased gradually, as well as their diplomatic pressure has gone from soft to hard which is 
consistent with the tactic George calls ‘turn the screw’. 
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6.5 The interplay between smart and normative power in the Ukrainian conflict   
EU’s sanctions against Russia should be seen as a tool to promote the objectives within the CFSP 
such as democracy, human rights, international law, peace and respect for rule of law (Council, 
2014A: 1). This can be seen in perspective to the normative values, Manners argues, the EU 
represents. Tornike Metreveli argues that the EU’s actions in Ukraine are the graveyard of EU’s 
normative power. Understood in the sense, that EU’s actions in Ukraine are not compatible with 
the normative aims that the EU represents (Metreveli, 2014). In reference to Manners, this is 
problematic because the normative values are being diffused through EU’s economic power. The 
normative power should be anchored in the norm itself, and without this, it can only be 
considered to be the spread of normative values. 
The economic sanctions used in the crisis lead to a wondering if normative power is a sufficient 
power in the Ukrainian conflict. Molly Krasnodębska argues that EU’s normative power has an 
important rhetoric and symbolic role in the crisis in Ukraine, but that these powers are not 
enough handling this crisis. Especially dealing with Russia who consider international politics as 
a zero-zum game (Krasnodębska, 2014), the adaptation of EU’s normative values could be seen 
as a reduction of power by Russia. With reference to Nye, the mix of economic sanctions and 
rhetoric and symbolic power can be considered as a smart strategy which, according to Nye, is 
the most effective style of leadership. 
Already in 2008, Hiski Haukkala argued, that EU’s normative power was in danger in 
neighbourhood relations. He argues that the use of normative power in relation to Russia is 
weakened because “(...) Russia has engaged in a series of business deals and economic 
transactions that could potentially undermine the Union’s hopes of enhancing its energy security 
in its immediate neighbourhood.” (Haukkala, 2008: 37). In retrospect to Nye’s concept 
contextual intelligence, the EU needs to use this knowledge about the strengths of Russia to 
develop smart-strategies (ibid: 37). This is an indication that normative power is not enough 
without hard power in the relation to Russia. However, the EU has a hard time attracting Russia 
with its values and demands. Understood with a starting point in Nye’s conception, this is 
problematic because the EU or any other actor cannot coerce Russia without attraction. 
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6.6 Partial conclusion 
The EU has, with its great economic power, been able to implement a gradual sanction strategy 
with damaging effects on the Russian economy. However, in relation to Manners theory, the role 
of normative power in the crisis has been criticised for being insufficient without hard power 
measures. The EU’s power in the conflict has been utilised through economic sanctions rather 
than through the norm itself, and therefore EU’s normative power in the conflict cannot be 
distinguished from other forms of power. Contrasting, in perspective to Nye, the EU has reacted 
in an effective manner in the conflict with contextual intelligence and a coercive strategy 
combining soft and hard measures into smart power. This has turned into a smart strategy where 
the EU promises to reengage with Russia, and remove sanctions, if they comply, while ‘turning 
the screw’ in order to keep up the pressure. Nye also focuses on attraction as a factor that can 
increase the efficiency of smart power; however the EU has had a hard time attracting Russia 
through its own norms and values. This analysis of the crisis has shown how the different forms 
of power interplay and affect the EU’s actions in conflict management. 
 
7. Discussion 
The following discussion will focus on EU’s actions in the Ukrainian conflict and how these are 
related to its powers, with the objective of discussing the fundamental problems of using 
normative power as the soft power part of a smart strategy. 
As analysed in chapter 6. EU’s actions in the conflict, have been focused on using sanctions as a 
threat in coercive diplomacy. In relation to its sanctions strategy analysed in chapter 5.2, the EU  
has in the conflict examined the target and its possible weaknesses, defined its objectives after 
this, chosen a specific tactic, and constantly reviewed and updated the implemented sanctions. 
Thereby, the EU has followed its own strategy, which follows the theoretical arguments on what 
a sanction strategy needs in order to be successful. EU’s coercive diplomacy strategy in the 
conflict has been in accordance with its coercive diplomacy strategy analysed in chapter 5.1 by 
choosing the comprehensive tactic and forming threats and punishments towards Russia. On the 
other hand, EU has not fulfilled its own objective with becoming a more coherent actor when it 
internally disagrees on its tactic with the use of sanctions in the conflict. Besides not acting in 
accordance with its own strategy, it does not fulfil the theoretical framework for a successful 
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coercive diplomacy strategy when it lacks to clearly communicate its strategy for coercion, to set 
up a reward for Russia if they comply as well as to create urgency for Russia to comply. The EU 
thereby follows its own ideal strategy, in regards to their use of sanctions, but encounters 
problems when acting within the framework of successful coercive diplomacy. This is a very 
practical explanation of why EU’s actions have not been able to force Russia to comply or at 
least negotiate. 
Though EU’s uncompleted strategy for the use of coercive diplomacy in the Ukrainian conflict 
could from Nye’s perspective be seen as an example of EU’s lack of attraction. EU’s objective of 
promoting normative values through the implementation of sanctions against Russia can be seen 
as an attempt of creating attraction along with coercion. This claim would then undermine the 
normative power of EU, because Manners and Diez would argue that they are diffused through 
hard power capabilities and not through the norms itself. They would thereby argue that 
normative power has not determined EU’s actions in the Ukrainian conflict, or created a 
fundament for a solid coercive diplomacy strategy. This is therefore an argument opposing that 
the lack of Russian compliance would be a reaction to an incomplete coercive diplomacy 
strategy, but instead a reaction to the complexity of using normative power as the soft power 
attraction in the smart strategy, which EU wishes to use in conflict management.  
 
8. Conclusion  
Through our analysis of EU’s power capabilities and conflict management tools, we can 
conclude that the interplay between EU’s powers affect its actions in conflict management. 
In our analysis, we argue that EU’s enhancement of its hard power capabilities makes EU’s 
normative power hard to distinguish from other forms of power. However, these hard power 
capabilities are developed with the aim of promoting EU’s normative values. This indicates a 
focus from the EU on improving the interplay between the two forms of power and thereby 
acquiring smart power. The focus from EU on smart power can be seen in its overall conflict 
management strategy as well as in its actions. The EU underlines this when it states that 
sanctions should be combined with incentives, negotiations and political dialogue to promote its 
normative values. We can thereby conclude that when EU tries to acquire smart power, it is 
through a combination of its economic hard power capabilities and its normative power. This 
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affects EU’s actions through its choice of conflict management tools. These tools either contain 
both powers or combine them, as when the EU uses economic measures in coercive diplomacy. 
Thereby we conclude that EU’s increased focus on smart power affects its conflict management 
strategy because EU uses economic threats or incentives as a way of coercing opponent states 
into diplomatic solutions based on its normative values. 
 
9. Suggestions for further research 
This project focuses on the EU as a coherent actor, and the internal dynamics has only 
sporadically been included. A different perspective on the theme in our project could be the EU’s 
internal matters impact on their actions in conflict management. The member states have 
different strategies and power tools which could affect EU’s actions in different directions. 
Following this, a perspective of the EU institutions could give a deeper knowledge of how the 
Commission, Council, Parliament, President and High Representative have different influence 
and power in shaping the EU’s conflict management. 
Further work on EU’s external power could include different conflict management tools and how 
the EU uses them in conflict management. The use of military missions or mediation could 
potentially show a different interplay or development in EU’s external power, or it could 
strengthen the conclusions found in this project.  
This project examines EU’s power and external political toolset from an actor’s perspective. 
Another possible direction for this project could be to follow a more institutional approach to the 
balance of power between different actors in the international society. This could be done by 
analysing how the international world order influences EU’s normative power, including terms 
as regional hegemony and balance of power.  Following this, a financial and economic 
perspective on EU’s power could be included with a deeper focus on economy, as the key power 
in conflict management. This might give a complementary perspective to our problem 
formulation by including how external structures affect EU’s external power and toolset.  
In the project, we conclude that EU’s actions in conflict management are very context dependent. 
Therefore, an inclusion of more examples where the EU acts in conflicts could result in a 
different or more nuanced conclusion.  
 
35 
10. Bibliography 
● 2007/C 306/01, “Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community”, European Union 
● Ashton, Catherine & the European Commission 2011A, “A partnership for democracy 
and shared prosperity with the southern mediterranean”, Joint Communication by the 
High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the 
European Commission 
● Ashton, Catherine & the European Commission 2011B, “A new response to a changing 
neighborhood”, Joint Communication by the High Representative of The Union For 
Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the European Commission 
● Biegon, Rubrick 2013 “The Banality of Smart Power: Reconstituting US Hegemony after 
Bush” School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent.  
● Bretherton, Charlotte & Vogler, John 2006, “The European Union as a Global Actor”,  
2nd edition, Routledge 
● Commission 2008, “Sanctions or restrictive measures”, European Commission. 
● Council 2003A, “A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy”, 
Council of the European Union 
● Council 2003B, “Strategy against proliferation of WMD”, Council of the European 
Union 
● Council 2004, “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)”, 
Council of the European Union 
● Council 2008A, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy”, 
Council of the European Union 
● Council 2014A, “EU restrictive measures”, Council of the European Union Press Office 
● Council 2014B, “EU strengthens sanctions against actions undermining Ukraine's 
territorial integrity”, Council of the European Union Press Office 
● Council 2014C, “EU adopts restrictive measures against actions threatening Ukraine's 
territorial integrity”, Council of the European Union Press Office 
● Council 2014D, “EU strengthens sanctions against separatist in Eastern Ukraine”, 
Council of the European Union Press Office 
36 
● Council 2014E, “Joint letter to the EU Heads of State or Government by the President of 
the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the European 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, on restrictive measures against Russia”, European 
Council The President Press Office 
● Council 2014F, “EU reinforced restrictive measures”, Council of the European Union 
Press Office 
● Diez, Thomas 2005, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 
Normative Power Europe” in Millennium-Journal of International Studies, Vol. 33, Issue 
3, SAGE Publications 
● Diez, Thomas & Manners, Ian 2007, “Reflecting on normative-power Europe” in 
Berenskoetter, Felix & Williams, Michael J. 2007, “Power in World Politics”, Routledge 
● Dover, Robert 2013, “The European Union’s Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies”, 
in Cini, Michelle & Borragán, Nieves Pérez-Solórzano 2013, “European Union 
Politics”, 4. edition, Oxford University Press 
● DR 2014, “Rusland udvider sanktioner mod Vesten: Stopper import af de fleste 
fødevarer”, http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Udland/2014/08/07/103947.htm, Retrieved 06-12-
2014 
● EEAS 2012, “About CSDP - The Treaty of Lisbon”, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-
csdp/lisbon/index_en.htm, Retrieved 04-12-2014 
● EEAS 2014A, “About CSDP - The Berlin Plus Agreement”, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm, Retrieved 03-12-2014 
● EEAS 2014B, “What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?”, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm, Retrieved 05-12-2014 
● EEAS 2014C, “Mission description”, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/mission-
description/index_en.htm, Retrieved 05-12-2014 
● EEAS 2014D, “About CSDP - The Petersberg Tasks”, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-
csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm, Retrieved 05-12-2014 
● EP intergroup for LGBT rights 2013, “MEPs welcome the annulment of Moldovan 
‘Propaganda Law’”, http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/press-releases/meps-welcome-the-annulment-
of-moldovan-propaganda-law/, Retrieved 05-12-2014 
37 
● EU delegation to the UN 2014, “Background: European Union Delegation to the United 
Nations in New York”, http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_458_en.htm, Retrieved 
05-12-2014 
● EU Newsroom 2014, “EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis”, 
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm, 
Retrieved 06-12-2014 
● Europa.eu 2012, “What is the Single Market?” 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/20years/singlemarket20/facts-figures /what-is-the-
single-market_en.htm, Retrieved 25-11-2014 
● Europa.eu, 2014A, “EU Position in World Trade”, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-
position-in-world-trade/, Retrieved 10-12-2014 
● Europa.eu, 2014B, “Legal personality of the Union”, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/union_legal_personality_en.htm, 
Retrieved 03-12-2014 
● European Union External Action 2013, “Common Security and Defence Policy - EU 
Battlegroups”, Council of the European Union 
● France24 2014, “A look at the European Parliament’s eurosceptic parties”, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20140527-europe-pictures-european-parliament-
eurosceptic-parties-fn-ukip/, Retrieved 12-12-2014 
● Garcia, Romualdo Bermejo & Garmendia, Rosana Garciandia 2012, “The EU as an actor 
at the WTO: its strengths and weaknesses throughout history” in Eastern Journal of 
European Studies Vol. 3, Issue 1 
● George, Alexander L. 1991, “Forceful Persuasion, Coercive Diplomacy as an alternative 
to War” Unite States Institute for Peace Press 
● Giumelli, Francesco 2013, “How EU sanctions work: A new narrative”, Chaillot Papers 
nr. 129, EU Institute for Security Studies 
● Haukkala, Hiski 2008, “The Russian Challenge to EU Normative Power: The Case of 
European Neighbourhood Policy”, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 43, Issue 2 
● Hill, Christopher & Smith, Michael 2011, “International Relations and the EU”, Oxford 
University Press 
38 
● Keukeleire, Stephan & MacNaughtan, Jennifer 2008, “The Foreign Policy of the 
European Union”, Palgrave Macmillan 
● Krasnodębska, Molly 2014, “The EU, Ukraine and the Limits of Normative Power”, 
http://www.cria.polis.cam.ac.uk/blog/?p=21, Retrieved 04-12-2014 
● Kreutz, Joakim 2005, “Hard Measures by Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European 
Union 1981-2004”, Bonn International Center for Conversation 
● Larsen, Henrik Boesen Lindbo 2014, “Great Power Politics and the Ukrainian Crisis: 
NATO, EU and Russia after 2014”, Danish Institute for International Studies 
● Manners, Ian 2002, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 40 
● Manners, Ian 2006, “Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, Issue 2 
● Merlingen, Michael 2007, “Everything Is Dangerous: A Critique of `Normative Power 
Europe”. Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, Issue 4 
● Metreveli, Tornike 2014, “EU in Crimea - The graveyard of Europe’s normative 
power?”, http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/81764-eu-in-crimea-the-graveyard-of-europes-
normative-power, Retrieved 06-12-2014 
● Nye, Joseph 2003, "Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power", International Herald Tribune 
● Nye, Joseph 2008, “Powers to lead: Soft, Hard and Smart”, Oxford University Press 
● Nye, Joseph 2009A, “Get Smart – combining hard and soft power”, Council on Foreign 
Relations 
● Nye, Joseph 2009B, “Smart Power – it’s a blend of soft and hard”, Leadership 
Intelligence, Vol. 26, Issue 2 
● Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge 2007, “Economic Sanctions and International Peace and 
Security” in Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, Fen Osler & Aall, Pamela 2007, “Leashing 
the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in A Divided World”, 1st edition, United States 
Institute of Peace Press 
● Reg. No 230/2014, 2014 “Establishing an instrument contributing to stability and 
peace”, L77/1, Official Journal of the European Union 
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